In Response to Jenn
Hmm, before I go on I better lay out the entire context of this discussion. Charmaine read the first four cantos of The Chelsiad and gave me the two comments, that while Athena thinks that "God is God because God is Good", it should be "God is Good because God is God". (So these two statements are not even my words!) Charmaine herself is confused about what she is trying to say, but these words were said, and I've decided to think of them as texts and trying to see construction of meaning. (May I add here that the debate between Jesus and Athena in the poem is my "stage" for exploring theological issues; neither Jesus nor Athena represents solely my viewpoint, although admittedly I must say I identity with Athena more in terms of my curiousity to know these issues.)
Basically, this logical analysis would be an extension to Athena's view point, her attempt to understand Christian theology. We met up the next day and talked more about this; what Charmaine is trying to say is that, from a Christian point of view, it is senseless to define what God "is". The previous night she quoted a section from the Exodus, in which Moses asks God what he should tell his people if he is ask to whom Moses is talking to, and God said "I am". The statement God is God has to be not because of any kind of logical structure, as Jenn you correctly pointed out; any Christian would say a purely logical analysis of God is absurd. God asks Moses to say "I am" to the people because, in my humble opinion, that is as close as the full presence of Being (taken in both the "metaphysical manifestation" and the Heideggerian senses) as possible. Had Moses say something like "God", or "Lord", etc, he will launch himself into a web of language, which is a constant deferring of meaning (all definitions are made up of other words, which would require other definitions). He must say "I am" in order to be true to God's intend, and in order for the establishment of transcendental faith. Charmaine's statement of "God is Good because God is God" is in one sense a paraphrasing of this belief (although rather awkwardly done). God cannot be defined, since that means one is not only restricting God (even if you say He has "infinite power", etc), but one is also constructing God in the act of definition, limting His be-ing (presence) to a mere word, and from a Christian's point of view, I cannot imagine this to be something desirable.
That is a response to Jenn your first comment. But then you went on to dissect my logical analysis with your second comment, which I find extremely interesting and challenging. And that is good: it is a kind of intellectual rigour lacking from most people these days; too often we have lapsed into an uncaring mode. (My father drily comments that the two statements mean the exact same thing.)
Perhaps it is better if I lay out all the original statements again, with different numberings, so it is easier to follow my examination.
1. God is God because God is Good.
2. God is Good because God is God.
3. Because God is Good, therefore God is God.
4. Because God is God, therefore God is Good.
5. Because apple is sweet, therefore apple is apple.
6. Because apple is apple, therefore apple is sweet.
7. Apple is sweet, therefore it is an apple (direct causality). Something is sweet. Something must be an apple?
S(tatement) 3 is a paraphrase of S1; S4 of S2. S5 and S6 have the same logical structure as 3 and 4. S7, which is a proper argument, is your rendition of S5.
One thing I should point out is that, while something can be causal, it doesn't make it an argument (which is syllogistic). I would argue that S7 is an incorrect rendition of S5. You are absolutely correct in saying that "sweetness" is the essence of "apple", just as in the poem Jesus explains to Athena that "Goodness" is the essence of a "God". S7, however, follows to commit a fallacy by adding "Something must be an apple". The words "must be" does not come from S5. "Apple" is defined by "sweetness", but not vice versa; if "it" is not sweet, "it" cannot be an apple; if "it" is sweet, it doesn't follow that "it" is necessarily an apple. That is all S5 means, and nothing else. It is Goodness that defines God; if Ares is not Good, then Ares is not God. If God is Good, then God is God.
The problem the above explanation brings up is this: God is no longer the primary term in the causal chain. He is limited by Goodness, since it is Goodness that causes his identity. Where did Goodness come from? If Goodness comes from God, then we have a circular argument, right? Not quite. In order to resolve that dilema, we need to make the distinction between Goodness as a law, and Goodness as an action. What must happen is that God needs to define Goodness first as a law, then all his actions have to follow that law. So there is Goodness (which becomes the primary term in the causal chain), but it is a logical possibility for God to act evil. (God, too, has free will and hence evil is a logical possibility that cannot be denied to Him.)
The other objection raised is that "if you say 'goodness causes/makes God', then if you are good enough you'll be God." That is indeed the logical outcome of S1. (This makes sense if you look at it from Athena's point of view: the Grecian gods are not really gods because they are not Good, or Powerful, or Merciful enough. There is no other way in which the Grecian gods can understand the overwhelming be-ing of God, which is meta-natural.) But Goodness (as a law) is a divine, meta-natural definition; how can a non-divine and natural being achieve Goodness? The difference between Goodness and goodness is that of the cosmic scale: goodness is for human beings and natural deities, while Goodness is for God.
*This is very demanding of my intellect, extremely stimulating, for it forces me to be extremely careful about language and the (mis)construction of meaning. It also forces me to consider about religion and metaphysics carefully.*
Basically, this logical analysis would be an extension to Athena's view point, her attempt to understand Christian theology. We met up the next day and talked more about this; what Charmaine is trying to say is that, from a Christian point of view, it is senseless to define what God "is". The previous night she quoted a section from the Exodus, in which Moses asks God what he should tell his people if he is ask to whom Moses is talking to, and God said "I am". The statement God is God has to be not because of any kind of logical structure, as Jenn you correctly pointed out; any Christian would say a purely logical analysis of God is absurd. God asks Moses to say "I am" to the people because, in my humble opinion, that is as close as the full presence of Being (taken in both the "metaphysical manifestation" and the Heideggerian senses) as possible. Had Moses say something like "God", or "Lord", etc, he will launch himself into a web of language, which is a constant deferring of meaning (all definitions are made up of other words, which would require other definitions). He must say "I am" in order to be true to God's intend, and in order for the establishment of transcendental faith. Charmaine's statement of "God is Good because God is God" is in one sense a paraphrasing of this belief (although rather awkwardly done). God cannot be defined, since that means one is not only restricting God (even if you say He has "infinite power", etc), but one is also constructing God in the act of definition, limting His be-ing (presence) to a mere word, and from a Christian's point of view, I cannot imagine this to be something desirable.
That is a response to Jenn your first comment. But then you went on to dissect my logical analysis with your second comment, which I find extremely interesting and challenging. And that is good: it is a kind of intellectual rigour lacking from most people these days; too often we have lapsed into an uncaring mode. (My father drily comments that the two statements mean the exact same thing.)
Perhaps it is better if I lay out all the original statements again, with different numberings, so it is easier to follow my examination.
1. God is God because God is Good.
2. God is Good because God is God.
3. Because God is Good, therefore God is God.
4. Because God is God, therefore God is Good.
5. Because apple is sweet, therefore apple is apple.
6. Because apple is apple, therefore apple is sweet.
7. Apple is sweet, therefore it is an apple (direct causality). Something is sweet. Something must be an apple?
S(tatement) 3 is a paraphrase of S1; S4 of S2. S5 and S6 have the same logical structure as 3 and 4. S7, which is a proper argument, is your rendition of S5.
One thing I should point out is that, while something can be causal, it doesn't make it an argument (which is syllogistic). I would argue that S7 is an incorrect rendition of S5. You are absolutely correct in saying that "sweetness" is the essence of "apple", just as in the poem Jesus explains to Athena that "Goodness" is the essence of a "God". S7, however, follows to commit a fallacy by adding "Something must be an apple". The words "must be" does not come from S5. "Apple" is defined by "sweetness", but not vice versa; if "it" is not sweet, "it" cannot be an apple; if "it" is sweet, it doesn't follow that "it" is necessarily an apple. That is all S5 means, and nothing else. It is Goodness that defines God; if Ares is not Good, then Ares is not God. If God is Good, then God is God.
The problem the above explanation brings up is this: God is no longer the primary term in the causal chain. He is limited by Goodness, since it is Goodness that causes his identity. Where did Goodness come from? If Goodness comes from God, then we have a circular argument, right? Not quite. In order to resolve that dilema, we need to make the distinction between Goodness as a law, and Goodness as an action. What must happen is that God needs to define Goodness first as a law, then all his actions have to follow that law. So there is Goodness (which becomes the primary term in the causal chain), but it is a logical possibility for God to act evil. (God, too, has free will and hence evil is a logical possibility that cannot be denied to Him.)
The other objection raised is that "if you say 'goodness causes/makes God', then if you are good enough you'll be God." That is indeed the logical outcome of S1. (This makes sense if you look at it from Athena's point of view: the Grecian gods are not really gods because they are not Good, or Powerful, or Merciful enough. There is no other way in which the Grecian gods can understand the overwhelming be-ing of God, which is meta-natural.) But Goodness (as a law) is a divine, meta-natural definition; how can a non-divine and natural being achieve Goodness? The difference between Goodness and goodness is that of the cosmic scale: goodness is for human beings and natural deities, while Goodness is for God.
*This is very demanding of my intellect, extremely stimulating, for it forces me to be extremely careful about language and the (mis)construction of meaning. It also forces me to consider about religion and metaphysics carefully.*
posted by Tristan at 7:38 p.m.
3 Comments:
"Clearly, the second instance does not really work."
Not really geh...
Didn't you learn about analyticity in PHIL 240? Or was your prof *not* a dyed-in-the-wool Anglo-American Analytic?
If Goodness is analytic to the concept of God, then there's no problem in saying "God is God, therefore God is Good."
Of course, whether Goodness is indeed analytic to the definition of God... or whether it's even possible Gor goodness to be analytic to the idea of God... is another question entirely.
There, my EE and the Philosophy of Religion class I took are actually proving useful... LOL.
Eh, whatever. I dislike sentential logic because it's so... un-Chinese... ;-) :-p
(P.S. 母狗不愧為母狗... "analyze" THAT)
Oops, that's supposed to say "... or whether it's even possible for Goodness to be analytic to the idea of God..."
interesting comment from Charmaine.
um. the concept of Goodness is not to be analytic to be idea of God, I believe.
now I'm glad that even Christianity could be a very subjective thing, after chatting with my beloved Christian friend.
Kenneth
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